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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
A R T H U R W. D E C K E R ,

\
Plaintiff, j

vs.
T H E I N D U S T R I A L COMMISSION OF U T A H D E P A R T M E N T
OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY,

Case No.
13838

Defendants.

DEFENDANTS' BRIEF
N A T U R E OF T H E CASE
This is a review by the Utah Supreme Court of
the decision of the Utah Board of Review of August
27, 1974, which affirmed the decision of the Appeals
Referee of May 28, 1974, denying unemployment benefits to the plaintiff for the 52 weeks commencing with
the week ended August 19, 1972, and requiring repayment of $2,229.00 in benefits received during the disqualification period, on the grounds that when filing
claims for unemployment benefits for the weeks ended
August 19 and August 26, 1972, the plaintiff know-
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ingly failed to report material facts about work and
earnings in order to obtain unemployment benefits. The
decision of the appeals referee had affirmed a determination of J u l y 3, 1973, by the D e p a r t m e n t of Employment Security, Industrial Commission of U t a h , assessing the foregoing disqualification and repayment requirement.
T h e basis for the disqualification was Section 35-45 ( e ) , Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which provides:
A n individual shall be ineligible for benefits or
for purposes of establishing a waiting period:
(e) F o r the week with respect to which he had
wilfully made a false statement or representation
or knowingly failed to report a material fact to
obtain any benefit under the provisions of this
act, and for the 51-week period immediately following and until he has repaid to the fund all
monies he received by reason of his fraud and
which he received during such following 51-week
disqualification period . . .
Section 35-4-6(d), Utah
further provides,

Code Annotated,

1953,

A n y person who, by reason of his fraud, has received any sum as benefits under this act to which
he was not entitled shall be liable to repay such
sum to the commission for the fund . . .
Plaintiff contends that the Commission determinations are not supported by sufficient evidence in the
record and that the statutory disqualification and re-
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payment requirement are in violation of his constitutional rights of substantive due process. Defendant contends that the determinations are amply supported upon
substantial competent evidence and even clear and convincing evidence in the record and that the statutory
disqualification and repayment requirements are clearly
well within the valid and proper constitutional exercise
of the police power of the State.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the Commission determinxations or, alternatively, a remand and rehearing.
Defendant seeks affirmation of such determinations.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff initiated an interstate claim for unemployment benefits against Utah from Arizona on May
5, 1972. His benefit amount was determined to be
$77.00 per week for a potential maximum duration of
36 weeks. Plaintiff is a high school graduate with two
quarters of college training. H e had experience in filing
claims for unemployment benefits in May 1972, and
again in July 1972, before filing the claims at issue
in this case for August 1972.
On September 15 1972, the plaintiff filed a claim
form (R. 50) for unemployment benefits for the weeks
ended August 19, 1972, andAugust 26, 1972. In response to the question "During the week(s) claimed in
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No. 7 and No. 8 above, did you work or earn wages
of any kind?" the plaintiff marked the answer "No".
The form further instructed that as to any work performed the claimant show the date of such work, employer name and address, daily pay, number of hours
worked, and reason for separation, if any. The plaintiff
made no entry in any of these spaces.
The plaintiff worked for H . & R. Transfer and
Storage Co. of Phoenix, Arizona, during the week
ended August 19,1972, earning $97.13. H e also worked
for this company during the week ended August 26,
1972, and earned $190.33. Payments for both weeks
of work were made to the plaintiff by August 30, 1972.
The plaintiff worked briefly for a different employer during the week ended September 2, 1972, earning $16.00 which he properly reported on September 5,
1972, upon his claim form for that week together with
the complete information as to the date, name and address of employer, daily pay, and hours worked (R. 59).
As a result of information obtained from H . & R.
Transfer and Storage Company the plaintiff was confronted about his failure to make any report about his
work or earnings, etc., for the weeks ended August 19
and August 26, 1972. On the basis of such failure, the
plaintiff was disqualified from receiving unemployment
benefits for the week ended August 19, 1972, and the
51 following weeks and thereafter until he repays to the
fund the amount of $2,229.00 in benefits wrongly received during the disqualification period.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
T H E DISQUALIFICATION AND REPAYMENT REQUIREMENTS W E R E PROPERLY ASSESSED UPON T H E EVIDENCE
T H A T T H E P L A I N T I F F A C T E D KNOWI N G L Y I N F A I L I N G TO R E P O R T H I S
W O R K OR E A R N I N G S W H I L E C L A I M I N G
UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS.
The defendant recognizes, as did the plaintiff, that
a proper application of the disqualification and repayment determinations in this case requires an affirmation
of the finding upon the record that the plaintiff knowingly failed to report material facts as to work or earnings in order to obtain unemployment benefits.
This Court has made no specific declaration under
Section 35-4-5 (e) of the Employment Security Act as
to the balance of evidence necessary to support Industrial Commission findings. However, the Court has, on
many occasions declared its requirement to uphold the
Commission findings and decision if there is substantial
evidence to sustain these. Members of Ironworkers
Union of Provo v. Industrial Commission, 104 U. 242,
139 P . 2d 208 (1943); Martinez v. Board of Review,
Department of Employment Security, 25 U. 2d 131,
477 P . 2d 587 (1970).
The Employment Security Act itself, 35-4-10(1),
U.C.A. 1953, provides:
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. . . In any judicial proceeding under this section
the findings of the commission and board of review as to the facts if supported by evidence shall
be conclusive . . .
In Gocke v. Weisley, 18 U. 2d 245, 249, 420 P . 2d
44, 46, (1966), the court stated that a reversal of an
order denying compensation can only be justified if
there be no substantial evidence to sustain the determination, and there is proof of facts giving rise to the right
of compensation so clear and persuasive that the refusal
to accept and make an award was clearly capricious,
arbitrary and unreasonable. In Kennecott Copper
Corp. Emp. v. Department of Employment
Security,
13 U. 2d 262, 264, 372 P . 2d 987 (1962), the court said:
. . . the evidence is to be looked at in the light
most favorable to the findings; and in so doing,
if there is evidence of any substance whatever
which can reasonably be regarded as supporting
the determination made, it must be affirmed . . .
While the applicable standard of review is, no
doubt, as cited above, the defendant contends that not
only is there substantial evidence in support of the
Commission's finding upon the record, but there is also
amply "clear and convincing" evidence to support the
Commission determination.
This Court has defined clear and convincing evidence to be such that there is "no serious or substantial
doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion." Greener
v. Greener, 116 U. 571, 212 P . 2d 194 (1949); Northcrest, Inc. v. Walker Bank and Trust Co., 122 U. 268,
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248 P . 2d 692, 298 (1952); Kirchgestner v. Denver and
R. G.W. R. Co., 118 U. 41, 233 P . 2d 699 (1951);
Poulsen v. Coombs, 123 U. 49, 253 P . 2d 621 (1953).
In the Greener case, the Court noted: "The evidence
. . . satisfied the mind of the trial court. His finding
should not be disturbed unless we must say that no one
could find the evidence clear and convincing. This does
not appear to be the case."
The plaintiff concedes the materiality of the facts
about work and earnings omitted by him in filing his
claim for unemployment benefits. The principle thrust
of plaintiff's contention, therefore, appears to be that
he was confused by not knowing how to report work
and earnings, the plaintiff asserting by way of argument
that he was not sure of the exact amount of the earnings.
However, the fact of the matter, as shown below by
reference to the plaintiff's own testimony, is that the
plaintiff did not report either work or earnings although
he well knew that he had worked and had had substantial earnings ($287.46). Neither did he correct his failure by reporting later when, as he admits, he had been
fully paid. Further, the plaintiff made no report about
the identity of his employer or other information about
the work although this information was called for on
the claims form and was known to him at the time he
completed the form.
The argument about not being certain, as to the
amount of earnings is a familiar one used to attempt to
excuse fraudulent claims, hence the additional requirements to report hours worked and identity of employer
7
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(see R. 50), material facts always known to a claimant
by the time any work is performed.
Without the need for reference to documents challenged by plaintiff's counsel as hearsay, the record fully
affirms the plaintiff's understanding of the claims
forms, processes, and reporting requirements: he is a
high school graduate with two quarters of college (R.
37) ; he had experience in filing claims during May, 1972,
and subsequently during July, 1972, prior to the claims
at issue filed for August, 1972, (R. 30-31); he had been
cautioned as to the need for care and thoroughness in
making out his claim forms (R. 29); the claims form
called for a report of work or earnings of any kind, including the date, employer, daily pay, and hours worked,
etc. (R. 50) ; the plaintiff knew at the time of filing the
claim form for the weeks ended August 19 and August
26, 1972, that he had just worked many hours for H . &
R. Transfer Company (R. 32), that his earnings were
"around $4.00" per hour (R. 32), and that such work
had been in the immediately preceding ten-day period
(R. 38).
I t is clear, further, that the plaintiff admitted knowing that his work was during the same ten-day period
as that to which the claim form applied (R. 38), and
that in response to the question as to whether he had
worked he answered "No" when he should have answered "Yes" (R. 39).
In addition, the record confirms that although the
plaintiff allegedly delayed reporting about his work
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because of uncertainty as to the amount of earnings, he
did not subsequently report the work when his exact
earnings were known to him (R. 36, R. 39, R. 40, R.
42), this despite the fact that he reported carefully and
correctly just a few days later the small amount of
$16.00 earned elsewhere (R. 39), showing fully the
date worked, name and address of the employer, amount
earned, and number of hours worked (R. 59). I t should
be noted that the report of $16.00 had only nominal
effect upon his benefits whereas the larger earnings, unreported by the plaintiff, would have temporarily displaced his unemployment benefits.
In addition to all of the foregoing, the record also
affirms by personal testimony, the established procedure
followed in Arizona at the time in question to instruct
claimants to report all work whether yet paid or not
and shows that such aid was extended, when necessary,
even to having a claims worker telephone the employer
in order to help the claimant report correctly (R. 26).
Of course such help could not be given in this case because the claimant did not divulge anything about the
work performed.
The foregoing evidence from the plaintiff's own
testimony, the testimony of the claims worker, and the
acknowledged claims documents submitted by the plaintiff leave no doubt as to his knowing failure to report
.material- facts about his work and earnings in order,
wrongly, to obtain unemployment benefits.
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POINT II
T H E DISQUALIFICATION AND REPAYMENT
REQUIREMENTS
OF
THE
UTAH; E M P L O Y M E N T S E C U R I T Y A C T A R E
A P R O P E R E X E R C I S E OF T H E POLICE
P O W E R OF T H E STATE AND ARE WHOLL Y I N ACCORD W I T H D U E P R O C E S S R E QUIREMENTS OF T H E U N I T E D STATES
CONSTITUTION.
The plaintiff's contentions on appeal are essentially
alternative, i.e., (1) that the claimant did not knowingly
fail to report about his work or earnings, and that (2)
even if he did, the legislative requirement for disqualification for unemployment benefits is a penalty in excess
of the police power of the State and hence a violation
of substantive due process guarantees of the United
States Constitution.
I t is, of course, clear that there are substantive due
process limits upon State police power. Jt is equally
clear, however, that they are not transcended or even
closely approached by the disqualification at issue in
this case. In general, Fourteenth Amendment due process requirements do not operate as a limitation upon
the police power of the state to pass and enforce such
reasonable laws as will inure to the health, morals, and
general welfare of the people. See 16 Am. Jur. 2d
Constitutional Law § 296 and numerous cases cited
therein, p. 478, note 15, including State v. Mason, 94 U.
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501, 78 P . 2d 920, 117 A L R 330 (1938) and Bountiful
City v. DeLuca, 77 U. 107, 292 P . 194, 72 A L R 657
(1930).
The national scheme of unemployment insurance
under respective state laws has, accordingly, been upheld in its beneficent purposes despite the application
therein of various disqualifications and penalties. Charles
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 57 S. Ct.
883, 81 L. Ed. 1279, (1937). Similarly, the constitutionality of the Utah unemployment insurance act as a
proper exercise of the State police power has also been
upheld by this Court. Globe Grain and Milling Co. v.
Industrial Commission, 98 U. 48, 97 P . 2d 582 (1939);
Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Industrial Commission,
Department of Placement and Unemployment Insurance, 104 U. 175, 134 P. 2d 479, rehearing denied 104
U. 196,141 P. 2d 694 (1943).
I t is further well established that the proper exercise of the State police power extends not only to
enactments necessary for preservation of health and
safety, etc., but also to the prevention of fraud, deceit,
cheating, and imposition. 16 Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional
Law § 312, and cases cited therein, p. 609, note 12.
The various state unemployment insurance laws all
(except Iowa) contain repayment requirements and dis^
qualification provisions for material false representations or omissions made in filing claims for unemployment benefits. Iowa provides for criminal sanctions
only. Most state provisions, like those in Utah, dis-
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qualify up to 52 weeks for material omissions or misrepresentations and require repayment of all benefits
received during the disqualification period. Comparison
of State Unemployment Insurance Laws, U.S. Department of Labor, Manpower Administration, Unemployment Insurance Service, p. 4-13 (Rev. September
1974).
The validity of these provisions has been uniformly
upheld and they have been applied in numerous decisions by the highest courts of the respective states.
Representative of numerous cases in New York is
that of Lack v. Catkerwood, 295 N.Y.S. 2d 550, 31 A.D.
663 (1968), in which the Supreme Court, Appellate
Division upheld the requirement that the claimant repay $1,300 in benefits wrongly received by reason of
her misrepresentation (failure to report work in family
business for husband) and also affirmed the prospective
application of an additional 52-week disqualification as
to future unemployment benefits.
I n Marlow v. Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, 4 Ohio App. 2d 299, 212 N . E . 2d 632 (1965),
the Ohio court upheld the indefinite disqualification of
the claimant for a false statement in his application for
unemployment benefits (falsely representing married
status to obtain $5 weekly dependent's allowance) and
required that he repay $1,128 to the unemployment insurance fund, such amount representing both the
wrongly obtained dependent's allowance and all other
benefits received.
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The Supreme Court of Washington in Allen v.
Employment Security Department, 83 Wash. 2d 145,
516 P . 2d 1032 (1973), upheld the 26 week disqualification of the claimant for misrepresentation of his reason
for separation when filing his claim for unemployment
benefits.
In Industrial Commission v. Bennett, 1 66 Colo,
101, 411 P.2d 648 (1968), the claimant's knowing failure to report school attendance on her claim for unemployment benefits was upheld by the Colorado Supreme
Court as a basis for disqualifying her for benefits for
52 weeks.
In Miranda v. Beaman, 95 Ariz. 388, 391 P . 2d 555
(1964), the Arizona court upheld the Employment
Security Commission, rejecting the credibility of the
claimant's assertion that he did not understand about
reporting his earning^and applying a disqualification
of 24 weeks for his failure to report. In that case, the
plaintiff-claimant had reported some of his earnings for
the week in question ($17.44) but had not reported the
entire amount earned ($52.32). In addition, he reported
"no" earnings for a subsequent week in which he had
actually earned $34.88.
The foregoing cases illustrate^unequivocal manner
in which the high courts have upheld sanctions against
unemployment insurance frauds and have supported legislative enactments imposing disqualifications under
the police power.
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The defendant urges, in summary, that the authority of the state to so act is well and thoroughly established and should be upheld.
CONCLUSION
The record is ample with credible evidence, clear
and convincing, that in filing claims for unemployment
benefits for the weeks ended August 19 and August 26,
1972, the plaintiff did knowingly fail to report material
facts about his work and earnings in order to obtain
benefits to which he was not entitled. It is further clear
that the disqualification under Section 35-4-5 (e), Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, is a valid and proper exercise of
the police power of the state; that the disqualification of
the plaintiff thereunder for the 52-week period commencing with the week ended August 19, 1972, was
properly applied; and that the plaintiff is liable to repay the $2,229 wrongly received in unemployment benefits during the disqualification period.
Respectfully submitted,
Attorneys for Defendants
V E R N O N B. R O M N E Y
Attorney General
E D G A R M. D E N N Y
Special Assistant Attorney General
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